Abstract. Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or``player.'' One is interested not only in each person's knowledge about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge about the others' knowledge. This paper examines two parallel approaches to the subject. The ®rst is the semantic approach, in which knowledge is represented by a space of states of the world, together with partitions I i of for each player i; the atom of I i containing a given state o of the world represents i's knowledge at that state ± the set of those other states that i cannot distinguish from o. The second is the syntactic approach, in which knowledge is embodied in sentences constructed according to certain syntactic rules. This paper examines the relation between the two approaches, and shows that they are in a sense equivalent.
Introduction
In interactive contexts like game theory and economics, it is important to consider what each player knows and believes about what the other players know and believe. Here we discuss and relate two formalisms ± the semantic and the syntactic ± for analyzing these matters. The current paper treats knowledge only; probability is left to a companion paper (Aumann 1999) .
The semantic formalism consists of a``partition structure:'' a space of states of the world, together with a partition of for each player, whose atoms represent information sets1 of that player; is called the universe. Like in probability theory, events are subsets of ; intuitively, an event is identi®ed with the set of all those states of the world at which the event obtains. Thus an event E obtains at a state o if and only if o e E, and a player i``knows'' E at o if and only if E includes his information set at o. For i to know E is itself an event, denoted K i E: it obtains at some states o, and at others does not. The knowledge operators K i can therefore be concatenated; for example, K j K i E denotes the event``j knows that i knows E.''
The syntactic formalism, on the other hand, is built on propositions, expressed in a formal language. The language has logical operators and connectives, and also operators k i expressing knowledge: If e is a sentence, then k i e is also a sentence, whose meaning is``i knows e.'' The operators k i can be iterated: The sentence k j k i e means``j knows that i knows e.'' Logical relations between the various propositions are expressed by formal rules.
There is a rough correspondence between the two formalisms: Events correspond to sentences, unions to disjunctions, intersections to conjunctions, inclusions to implications, complementation to negation, and semantic knowledge operators K i to syntactic knowledge operators k i . But the correspondence really is quite rough; for example, only some ± not all ± events correspond to syntactically admissible sentences.
While the semantic formalism is the more convenient and widely used of the two, it is conceptually not quite straightforward. One question that often arises is, what do the players know about the formalism itself? Does each know the others' partitions? If so, from where does this knowledge derive? If not, how can the formalism indicate what each player knows about the others' knowledge? For example, why would the event K j K i E then signify that j knows that i knows E?
Another point concerns the interpretation of the concept``state of the world.'' In game theoretic applications, for example, the state of the world often speci®es the players' actions. Some feel that this restricts the freedom of action of a player, by``forcing'' him, at the state o, to choose the action that o speci®es for him. Why, they ask, should he not be allowed, if he wishes, to choose a di¨erent action at that state?
More generally, the whole idea of``state of the world,'' and of a partition structure that accurately re¯ects the players' knowledge about other players' knowledge, is not transparent. What are the states? Can they be explicitly described? Where do they come from? Where do the information partitions come from? What justi®es positing this kind of model, and what justi®es a particular partition structure?
One may also ask about the global properties of the partition structure. We have seen that there is a rough correspondence between the semantic and syntactic models. Do global properties of the partition structure correspond to anything syntactic? For example, if the partition structure is ®nite, does this correspond to anything in the syntactic formalism? Can ®niteness of the partition structure be formulated in syntactic terms ± that is, in plain English?
A related point is that the semantic formalism is not canonical: There are many essentially di¨erent partition structures. Which is the``right'' one?
These questions are not unanswerable. For example, an answer to the last question (which is the``right'' partition structure?) is that it usually doesn't matter; proofs using the semantic formalism generally work with any partition structure. We also hold that the issue of the players'``freedom of action,'' while super®cially puzzling, poses no real problem Brandenburger 1995, Section 7a, p. 1174 ). Yet all in all, there is little doubt that conceptually and philosophically, the semantic formalism is comparatively subtle.
In contrast, the syntactic formalism is entirely straightforward. One reasons from explicit hypotheses to explicit conclusions using explicit, transparent rules of deduction. There are no philosophical subtleties, no problems with the meaning of the sentences that enter the syntactic formalism. And this formalism is canonical.
Thus the semantic formalism appears to involve nontrivial conceptual issues. There are two approaches to these issues. One is to deal with them on the verbal, conceptual level, while retaining the semantic formalism as a formal primitive. In the other, the semantic formalism ± the partition structure ± is no longer taken as primitive, but is explicitly constructed from another formalism.
In the past, such explicit constructions have employed a hierarchical procedure (see Section 10c). While perfectly coherent, these hierarchical procedures are cumbersome and far from transparent. Here, we construct a canonical semantic partition structure in a more straightforward way, directly in terms of the syntactic formalism. In this construction, the states are simply lists of propositions. Each state o is de®ned by specifying those propositions that hold at o; any list of propositions that is complete, coherent and consistent in the appropriate sense constitutes a state.
Before presenting this construction, we set forth both the semantic (Sections 1, 2, 3) and the syntactic (Sections 4, 5) formalisms in detail. Section 1 presents the foundations of the semantic formalism for the fundamental case of one player, including an axiomatic development of the knowledge operator. Section 2 develops the many-player case, concentrating on a succinct presentation of the fundamental properties of common knowledge. Section 3 is a conceptual discussion of the semantic formalism, presenting in more detail some of the issues discussed above, and setting the stage for the subsequent canonical construction in terms of the syntactic formalism. Section 4 formally presents the syntactic formalism, and Section 5 discusses it. Section 6 constructs the canonical semantic partition structure in terms of the syntactic formalism, and Section 7 is a conceptual discussion of this construction. Section 8 establishes in precise terms the above-discussed``rough'' correspondence between the syntactic and the semantic formalisms. In Section 9, this is used to show that a list of sentences in the syntactic formalism is logically consistent if and only if it has a semantic``model.'' Section 10 is devoted to additional discussion, including discussion of the relationship between thè`d irect'' construction of the canonical semantic partition structure that is presented here, and the hierarchical construction to which we alluded above. An appendix discusses the cardinality of the canonical universe (which, when there is more than one player, is at least that of the continuum).
This paper originated in notes for a series of lectures given at Yale University in 1989, and informally circulated, in various forms, for many years thereafter. Much of the material is basically due to others, and has been known for some time2, though perhaps not in the form presented here. Nevertheless, this is not a review; there is no attempt to cover any signi®cant part of the literature, nor even to cite it. Rather, it is largely expository; the purpose is to make the basic facts of interactive epistemology accessible in a succinct form that should be useful for game theorists and economists.
Doing justice to all the relevant previous work would take more e¨ort, time and space than we can a¨ord here. However, we do wish to cite one particular work to which we owe the greatest immediate debt: Dov Samet's`I gnoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree' ' (1990) , from which we drew the simple but ingenious and fundamental idea of formally characterizing a state of the world by the sentences that hold there.
The semantics of knowledge for a single individual
In this section we present and examine the relationships between ®ve di¨er-ent but equivalent semantic formalizations of knowledge: knowledge functions, information functions, information partitions, knowledge operators, and knowledge u®elds (universal ®elds).
We start with a set whose members are called states of the world, or simply states. An event is de®ned as a subset of ; the family of all events is denoted E. This formalism may be familiar to some readers from probability theory; an event in the ordinary sense of the word, like``it will be sunny tomorrow,'' is identi®ed in the formalism with the set of all states at which it is sunny tomorrow. Union of events corresponds to disjunction, intersection to conjunction, and complementation d to negation. For example, the event`i t will snow or rain tomorrow'' is the same as the union of the event``it will snow tomorrow'' with the event``it will rain tomorrow.'' When E and F are events with E r F , we will say that E entails F.
We will assume given a function k on , which we call the knowledge function. The range of k is an abstract set, whose members represent di¨erent possible``states of knowledge'' of some ®xed individual i. Thus, ko represents the knowledge that i possesses when the true state of the world is o. For example, this knowledge might include today's weather, but not tomorrow's. A related way of thinking about ko is as the signal that i receives from the outside world when the true state of the world is o.
De®ne a function I on by Any function I on satisfying 1.11 and 1.12 is called an information function. From 1.11 and 1.12 it follows that the distinct Io form a partition of ; that is, they are pairwise disjoint and their union is . We call this partition i's information partition, and denote it I; atoms of I are called information sets.
The family of all unions of events in I, denoted K, is a universal ®eld, or u®eld for short; that is, it is closed under complementation and under arbitrary (not necessarily ®nite or denumerable) unions, and therefore also under arbitrary intersections. It is called i's knowledge u®eld. Now de®ne an operator K X E 3 E as follows: for any event E, KE is the union of all the events in I that are included in EX 1X2
Equivalent forms of this de®nition are o e KE if and only if Io r EY and 1X21
KE is the largest element of K that is included in EX 1X22
In words, KE is the event that i knows that the event E obtains3; more explicitly, the set of all states o at which i knows that E contains o (he usually will not know the true o). From 1.22 it follows that KE e K for all E. Conversely, if E e KY then 1.22 yields E KE, so each member of K has the form KE. Thus we conclude that
In words, K is the family of events that express i's knowing some particular event.
The reader may verify, directly from its de®nition, that the operator K has the following properties (for all events E and F):
3 By``obtains'' we mean``happened, is happening, or will happen.'' Time is irrelevant; we want to avoid tenses. If the reader wishes, he can think of a state o of the world as a complete possible history, from the big bang until the end of the world. Thus``it will snow tomorrow'' and``it snowed yesterday'' are both events, which may or may not``obtain'' at a given o.
In words, 1.31 says that a person can only know something if it is true; and 1.33, that if he does not know something, then he knows that he does not know it. 1.32 expresses the intuition that if E entails F, and i knows that E, then he may conclude that F, so he knows F. Any operator K X E 3 E satisfying 1.31 through 1.33 is called a knowledge operator. Note also that
where the intersection may be over an arbitrary index set; this, too, follows directly from 1.2. In words, 1.4 says that i knows each of several events if and only if he knows that they all obtain. Rather than starting with the knowledge function k as a primitive, and deriving from it the information function I, the information partition I, the knowledge operator K, and the knowledge u®eld K, one can start from any other one of these ®ve and derive the other four from it. The only one of these derivations that is not entirely straightforward4 is that starting with K; we show below how to do this. To have a term for the relationship between the objects kY IY IY KY K de®ned in this section, call any two of them associated.
We now show how IY kY I and K can be derived if we start with a knowledge operator K as a primitive. So suppose we are given such a K, i.e., an operator K X E 3 E satisfying 1.31 through 1.33. It is enough to de®ne I, as we have already noted that I, k, and K can be derived from I. We de®ne
In words, 1.5 de®nes Io as the set of all those states at which i does not know that o did not occur; i.e., those he cannot distinguish from o, the ones he considers possible. This is precisely the intuitive meaning of I that is embodied in the original de®nition 1.1. To justify the de®nition (1.5), we must show Proposition 1.6. As de®ned from K by 1.5, I is an information function and satis®es 1.21.
Indeed, by proving that I satis®es 1.21, we show that it is associated with K in the sense explained at the end of Section 1. Thus if we start with I, de®ne K from it by means of 1.2, and then apply the de®nition (1.5), we get back an information function identical to that with which we started.
Proof of Proposition 1.6: In this proof, we may use only 1.5 and 1.31 through 1.33, not formulas derived from the de®nitions in the body of the text.
To show that I is an information function, we must establish 1.11 and 1.12. To prove 1.11, note that dfog s Kdfog by 1.31, so fog r dKdfog Io. 1.12 will be established below. 
Common knowledge
Let N be a collection of several individuals i, each with his own knowledge function k i , knowledge operator K i , knowledge u®eld K i , information partition I i , and information function I i ; the space of states of the world and the u®eld E of events remain the same for all individuals. We call N the population.
Call an event E common knowledge (in the population) if all know E, all know that all know it, all know that all know that all know it, and so on ad in®nitum. Formally, de®ne operators K m from E to E by
If o e K i E, we say that``i knows E at o.'' Thus K i E is the set of all states of the world at which i knows E; in other words, K i E is the event that i knows E. If o e K y E, we say that``E is commonly known at o;'' and K y E is the event that E is commonly known. Similarly, K 1 E is the event that E is mutually known (between the individuals in N), and K m E that E is m'th level mutual knowledge. Thus m'th level mutual knowledge of E means that all relevant individuals know E, all know that all know it, and so on, but only m times; and an event is common knowledge i¨it is mutual knowledge at all levels.
Lemma 2.3.
Proof: The inclusion r follows from 1.31. For the opposite inclusion, 2.1 and 1.4 yield
Lemma 2.4.
Proof: Follows from 2.1, 2.2, 1.31, and 1.32.
Call an event F self-evident if K i F F for all i; that is, if the event itself entails everyone knowing it (in other words, whenever it obtains, everyone knows that it obtains). For example, if two people enter into a contract6, then it is self-evident to them that they do. From 1.9 we get An event is self-evident if and only if it is in U i e N K i X 2X5 Theorem 2.6. K y E is the largest event in U i e N K i that is included in E. In words: E is commonly known if and only if some self-evident event that entails E obtains.
Proof: By 2.3, 1.8, and 2.41,
Corollary 2.7. K y is a knowledge operator, and the associated knowledge u®eld is U i e N K i .
Remark. The events in U i e N K i are those that are in all the K i ; those that are common to them all. This provides an additional rationale for the term`c ommon knowledge;'' it is knowledge that is, in a sense, common7 to the protagonists. Of course, the main rationale for the term``common knowledge'' is that its everyday meaning8 corresponds nicely to the formal de®nition at 2.1.
6 In common law, a contract is sometimes characterized as a``meeting of the minds.'' Interpreted more broadly ± i.e., epistemically only, without necessarily involving the element of mutual commitment ± the idea of``a meeting of the minds'' nicely encapsulates the notion of a self-evident event.
7 To be sharply distinguished from the knowledge that results if the protagonists share (tell each other) what they know. The latter corresponds to the u®eld, sometimes denoted R i e N K i , comprising unions of events of the form U i e N E i , where E i e K i for each i. This is quite di¨erent from U i e N K i ; in particular, U i e N K i is included in (represents less information than) each of the K i , whereas R i e N K i includes each of them (represents more information). 8 Suppose you are told``Ann and Bob are going together,'' and respond``sure, that's common knowledge.'' What you mean is not only that everyone knows this, but also that the announcement is pointless, occasions no surprise, reveals nothing new; in e¨ect, that the situation after the announcement does not di¨er from that before. This is precisely what is described in 2.6; the event`A nn and Bob are going together'' ± call it E ± is common knowledge if and only if some event ± call it F ± happened that entails E and also entails all players' knowing F (like if all players met Ann and Bob at an intimate party). Contrast the familiar missionary story, in which announcing the facts changes the situation dramatically, in spite of everybody's knowing the facts, knowing that everybody knows them, and so on up to the 36'th order. If the facts had been common knowledge, in the everyday meaning of the phrase, the announcement would have changed nothing.
Proof: Each u®eld K is associated with a unique information partition I, and so by 1.2, with a unique knowledge operator K (given by 1.22). By 2.6, K y is the knowledge operator associated with the u®eld U i e N K i . 9
Corollary 2.8. K y E r K y K y E, and dK y E r K y dK y E. In words: If an event is commonly known, then it is commonly known that it is commonly known; if it is not commonly known, then it is commonly known that it is not commonly known.
Proof: A consequence of 2.7, using 1.8 and 1.33. 9
Remark 2.9: K y . In words: An event obtaining at all states is commonly known at each state.
Proof: 1.7 and 2.7. 9
The information partition and information u®eld corresponding to the knowledge operator K y are denoted I y and K y respectively. is called the universe. The member of K y are called common knowledge subuniverses, or simply subuniverses; they are the self-evident events. The atoms of I y are called common knowledge components (of ); they are the minimal non-empty subuniverses. The structure consisting of the universe , the population N, and the knowledge functions k i of the individuals i is called a semantic knowledge system.
In the sequel, we sometimes consider common and mutual knowledge among the individuals in a speci®ed proper subset N H of N. Thus in Section 10A, we treat a world with three individuals, and consider common and mutual knowledge among two out of the three. In that case, the same de®nitions and notation as above apply, with N replaced by N H .
Discussion
When we come to interpret the model introduced in Section 2, an inevitable question is,``what do the participants know about the model itself ?'' Does each``know'' the information partitions I i of the others? Are the I i themselves in some sense``common knowledge''? If so, how does this common knowledge come about ± how does each individual get to know what the others' partitions are? If not, how does the model re¯ect each individual's information ± or lack of information ± about the others' partitions? To do this right, doesn't one need to superpose another such model over the current one, to deal with knowledge of (or uncertainty about) the I i ? But then, wouldn't one need another and yet another such model, without end even in the trans®nite domain? Addressing this question in 1976, we wrote as follows:``. . . the implicit assumption that the information partitions . . . are themselves common knowledge . . . constitutes no loss of generality. Included in the full description of a state o of the world is the manner in which information is imparted to the two persons. This implies that the information sets I 1 o and I 2 o are indeed de®ned unambiguously as functions of o, and that these functions are known to both players. '' In 1987, we were more expansive:``While Player 1 may well be ignorant of what Player 2 knows ± i.e., of the element of I 2 that contains the`true' state o of the world ± 1 cannot be ignorant of the partition I 2 itself. . . . Indeed, since the speci®cation of each o includes a complete description of the state of the world, it includes also a list of those other states o H of the world that are, for Player 2, indistinguishable from o. If there were uncertainty about this list on the part of Player 1 (or any other player), then the description of o would not be complete; one should then split o into several states, depending on which states are, for 2, indistinguishable from o. Therefore the very description of the o's implies the structure of I 2 , and similarly for all the I i . The description of the o's involves no`real' knowledge; it is only a kind of code book or dictionary. The structure of the I i also involves no real knowledge; it simply represents di¨erent methods of classi®cation in the dictionary.'' That is all well and good as far as it goes; but it leaves some important questions unanswered.
Can such a``dictionary'' actually be constructed? Isn't there some kind of self-reference implicit in the very idea of such a dictionary? If it can nevertheless be constructed, is the construction in some sense unique,``canonical''? If not, which of the possible``dictionaries'' would the participants use?
The most convincing way to remove all these questions and doubts is to construct and the I i ± or equivalently, the k i ± in an explicit, canonical, manner, so that it is clear from the construction itself that the knowledge operators are``common knowledge'' in the appropriate sense. This will be done in Section 6, making use of the syntactic formalism. But ®rst, we introduce the syntactic formalism for its own sake.
The syntactic knowledge formalism
As in Section 2, we assume given a set N of individuals, called the population. We start by constructing a certain``language'', in purely formal terms; afterwards we interpret it. The building blocks of the language are the following symbols, constituting the keyboard:
Letters from an alphabet X X fxY yY zY F F FgY taken as fixed throughoutY and the symbols RY XY Y Y and k i for all i in NX A formula is a ®nite string of symbols obtained by applying the following three rules in some order ®nitely often:
Every letter in the alphabet is a formulaX 4X11
If f and g are formulasY so is f R gX 4X12
If f is a formulaY so are X f and k i f for each iX 4X13
In the sequel, we often omit parentheses when the intended meaning is clear, and we use f A g as an abbreviation for
It is called epistemically closed if
and strongly closed if it is both logically and epistemically closed. The strong closure of a list L is the smallest strongly closed list9 that includes L. A tautology10 is a formula in the strong closure of the list of all formulas having one of the following seven forms (for some fY gY h and i):
A formula g is a consequence of (or follows from) a formula f if f A g is a tautology.
The set of all formulas with a given population N and alphabet X is called a syntax, and is denoted SNY X, or just S. For convenience11, assume that N and X are ®nite or denumerable; it follows that S is denumerable.
Interpretation of the syntactic formalism
The syntactic formalism is subject to di¨erent interpretations; for now, we present only one. The letters of the alphabet represent what may be called`n atural occurrences'': substantive happenings that are not themselves described either in terms of people knowing something, or as combinations of other natural occurrences using the connectives of the propositional calculus12. Such a``natural'' occurrence might be,``it will snow tomorrow.'' Not all possible natural occurrences need be represented in the alphabet; normally, one restricts oneself to natural occurrences that are``relevant'' to the matter under discussion. In many cases of interest these constitute a ®nite set, perhaps even with just one element.
The symbol``k i '' means``i knows that . . .''. So if x stands for``it will snow tomorrow,'' then k i x stands for``i knows that it will snow tomorrow.'' The symbol``X'' means``it is not true that'', and the symbol``R'' means``or''. Parentheses have their usual meaning. Thus a formula is a ®nite concatenation of natural occurrences, using the operators and connectives13 of the propositional calculus, and the knowledge operators k i .
In ordinary discourse, a``tautology'' is a statement that is logically necessary, one that embodies no empiric knowledge, nothing substantive about the real world, one whose truth is inherent in the meaning of the terms involved (like``a circle is round''). That is the meaning intended here. For example, formulas of the form 4X4Á, which embody the axioms of the propositional calculus, are tautologies; so are formulas of the form 4X5Á, which embody fundamental properties of knowledge.14 A logical deduction from a tautology is also a tautology. This is embodied in the condition that the set of tautologies be logically closed, i.e., obeys 4.2 (called the rule of modus ponens): if f and f A g are tautologies, so is g.
In addition, the set of tautologies is epistemically closed, i.e., obeys 4.3 (this is called the rule of necessitation15): if f is a tautology, so is k i f . In e¨ect, this says that each individual knows each tautology, and that this is a logical necessity. Thus it is part of the logical infrastructure that the individuals are logically consistent. It follows that everybody knows this itself as a logical necessity, so that, for example, if f is a tautology, then so are k j k i f , k i k j k i f , and so on. In this sense, one might say that it is``commonly known'' that all individuals reason logically, though in the syntactic formalism, common knowledge has not been formally de®ned.
The formal de®nition of tautology in Section 4 embodies precisely these principles: A tautology is de®ned as a formula that follows from the axioms of logic (including the logic of knowledge) by repeated use of modus ponens and the rule of necessitation.
In applications, the semantic and the syntactic formalisms have similar functions: Either may be used formally to analyze interactive situations ± such as games or economies ± in which the knowledge of the protagonists plays a role. In principle, the syntactic formalism is the more straightforward; it simply represents the usual methods of logical deduction. Thus given a hypothesis f, we may conclude that g if and only if f A g is a tautology. The semantic formalism is more roundabout. In it, sentences are replaced by``events'' ± sets of states of the world. Speci®cally, a sentence f is replaced by the set of those states of the world at which f obtains. To conclude g from f, one shows that the corresponding events G and F satisfy F r G; i.e., that F entails G, that g obtains at each state of the world at which f does.
What we here call a``tautology'' is in formal logic sometimes called à`t heorem,'' the term``tautology'' being reserved for sentences that``hold at'' each state of each semantic knowledge system. Actually, the two meanings are equivalent, as will be shown below (9.4). Using the term``theorem'' in this connection would cause confusion with the more usual kind of theorem ± the kind that appears in papers like this, and in particular in this paper itself.
Though in principle the syntactic formalism is more straightforward, in practice the semantic formalism is often more useful.16 On the other hand, the semantic formalism is beset by the conceptual di½culties discussed in Section 3 and in the introduction. To overcome these di½culties, we now construct an explicit canonical semantic knowledge system, using the syntactic formalism introduced in Section 4.
The canonical semantic knowledge system
As in Section 4, assume given a ®nite population N and an alphabet X. Call a list L of formulas coherent if
De®ne a state o of the world, or simply a state, as a closed, coherent, and complete list of formulas that contains all tautologies. Denote the set of all states NY X, or simply . For all individuals i, de®ne a knowledge function k i on by specifying that for all states o, k i o is the set of all formulas in o that start with k i X 6X3
The system comprising , N, and the k i is called the canonical semantic knowledge system for the population N and the alphabet X (or simply the canonical system).
Interpretation of the canonical system
Intuitively, once a state o of the world has been speci®ed, there can be no remaining uncertainty, or at least no``relevant'' uncertainty. This means that at o, each of the denumerably many possible formulas is either de®nitely true or de®nitely false. Our device is formally to de®ne a state o as the list of those formulas that are true at o. Thus for each formula f, either f itself or its negation X f must be in the list that de®nes o (completeness), and only one of these two alternatives can obtain (coherence). Also, the ordinary processes of logical deduction are assumed valid at each state; anything that follows logically from formulas true at a certain state is also true at that state. This is embodied in two conditions. The ®rst is that each state o is logically closed, which means that modus ponens (4.2) is satis®ed at o (A stands for``implies''). The second is that all tautologies are true at each state.
At a given state o, which formulas does individual i know? Well, it is all written in the list that de®nes o. He knows exactly those formulas that it says in the list that he knows: namely, those formulas f such that k i f is in the list. We can now address the question raised in Section 3, whether each individual``knows'' the information partitions I i of the others. The I i are de®ned in terms of the information functions k i , and so in terms of the operators k i (which, in the formulation of Section 6, replace the k i as primitives of the system). Thus the question becomes, does each individual``know'' the operators k i of the others (in addition, of course, to his own)?
The answer is``yes.'' The operator k i operates on formulas; it takes each formula f to another formula. Which other formula? What is the result of operating on f with the operator k i ? Well, it is simply the formula k i f .`K nowing'' the operator k i just means knowing this de®nition. Intuitively, for an individual j to``know'' k i means that j knows what it means for i to know something. It does not imply that j knows any speci®c formula k i f .
Suppose, for example, that f stands for``it will snow tomorrow.'' For j to know the operator k i implies that j knows that k i f stands for``i knows that it will snow tomorrow;'' it does not imply that j knows that i knows that it will snow tomorrow (indeed, i may not know this, and perhaps it really will not snow).
In brief, j's knowing the operator k i means simply that j knows what it means for i to know something, not that j knows anything speci®c about what i knows.
Thus the assertion that each individual``knows'' the knowledge operators k i of all individuals has no real substance; it is part of the framework. If j did not``know'' the operators k i , he would be unable even to consider formulas in the language of Section 4, to say nothing of knowing or not knowing them.
From this we conclude that all individuals indeed``know''17 the functions k i , as well as the partitions I j .
17 It should be recognized that``knowledge'' in this connection has a meaning that is somewhat di¨erent from that embodied in the operators k i and K i ; that is why we have been using quotation marks when talking about``knowing'' an operator or a partition. That an individual i knows an event E or a formula f can be embodied in formal statements o e K i E or k i f P o) that are well de®ned within the formal systems we have constructed, and whose truth or provability can be explicitly discussed in the context of these formal systems. This is not the case for``knowing'' an operator or a partition. For discussion of a related point, see Section 10a.
We conclude this section by recalling the end of Section 3, where we said that``the description of the o's involves no`real' knowledge; it is only a kind of code book or dictionary.'' We have now explicitly constructed this`d ictionary;'' the construction is canonical (given the set N of individuals and the alphabet X); no self-reference is involved; and all individuals``know'' the description of the model, including the partitions I i .
The relationship between the syntax and semantics of knowledge
In the foregoing we developed two related but distinct approaches to interactive epistemology. The states-of-the-world construction presented in Sections 1 and 2 embodies the semantic approach. The approach of Section 4, involving a formal``language,'' is syntactic. In our development, the syntactic approach is the more fundamental: In Section 6, we de®ne semantics (states o and knowledge functions k i ) in terms of syntax (the formal language).
There are some obvious correspondences between the two approaches. Formulas (syntactic) correspond to events (semantic); disjunction, conjunction, and negation correspond to union, intersection, and complementation; the knowledge operators k i to the knowledge operators K i . By``correspond'', we mean``have similar substantive content''. Thus``i knows that it will snow or rain tomorrow'' is expressed by k i x R y in the syntactic formalism and by K i E x E y in the semantic formalism, where x and E x stand for``it will snow tomorrow'', and y and E y for``it will rain tomorrow''. Formally, k i x R y and K i E x E y are distinct objects; the ®rst is a string of letters, connectives, operators and parentheses, the second a set of states. But substantively, they express the same thing.
The purpose of this section is to formalize the correspondence between syntactic and semantic entities, to embody it in precise theorems. We will see that the correspondence is not complete; whereas every formula f corresponds to a unique event E f , it is not the case that every event corresponds to some formula. Roughly, the reason is that formulas are ®nite concatenations, whereas events can also express in®nite concatenations (e.g., in®nite unions). But subject to this caveat (i.e., if one considers events of the form E f only), we will see that there is a perfect``isomorphism'' between the syntactic and semantic approaches.
Unless otherwise stated, the population N and the alphabet X ± and so also the syntax S SNY X ± will be taken as ®xed, as in Section 4.
In the sequel, we use the following standard notations (for arbitrary formulas f and g):
The following syntactic formulation of``positive introspection'' will be needed in the sequel: Proposition 8.1. Any formula of the form k i f D k i k i f is a tautology.
Proof: Analogous to the proof of 1.8.
We proceed now to a precise formulation of the``isomorphism'' between the syntactic and semantic approaches. If f is a formula, de®ne
In words, E f is the set of all states of the world containing the formula f, i.e., the set of all states at which f is true; in other words, it is the event that f obtains. The``isomorphism'' is embodied in the following three propositions ( f and g denote arbitrary formulas, i an arbitrary individual):
Proposition 8.5. E f r E g if and only if f A g is a tautology.
Though 8.4 is analogous to the components of 8.3, we have stated it separately because its proof lies considerably deeper. From 8.4 we will deduce that for any event E (not necessarily of the form E f ),
In words, 8.51 says that K i E is the event that E follows logically18 from the formulas f that i knows. For a discussion of this result, see Section 10a. From 8.5 it follows19 that E f E g if and only if f D g is a tautologyX 8X52
In words, 8.52 says that logically equivalent formulas correspond to the same event20. The proofs require some preliminary work. Call a formula f elementary if it contains no k i . A theorem of the propositional calculus is de®ned as an elementary formula that yields the truth value T for each assignment of truth values to the letters appearing in it (using the usual rules for calculating truth values).
18 E s F means that E is a logical consequence of F. Compare Proposition 8.5 and Footnote 15. 19 A formal derivation is given below. 20 The term``isomorphism'' usually denotes a one-one correspondence that preserves the relevant operations. In our case, the correspondence between formulas and events is not one-one, even when one considers events of the form E f only. But from 8.52, it follows that there is a one-one correspondence between events of the form E f and equivalence classes of formulas (under logical equivalence); and by 8.3 and 8.4, this correspondence indeed preserves the relevant operations.
Lemma 8.61. Let e be a theorem of the propositional calculus, possibly in a syntax di¨erent from the given one21. Let f be a formula (in the given syntax) that is obtained by substitution22 from e. Then f is a tautology, and so is in each state o.
Proof: Let S be the given syntax, S H a syntax containing e. Since e is a theorem of the propositional calculus, it can be derived23 by repeatedly applying modus ponens to formulas of the form 4.4. (recall that the rule of modus ponens allows one to derive h from g and g A h). The formal expression of modus ponens is 4.2, so e is in the closure of the list of formulas of the form 4X4Á in S H . Now f is obtained from e by substituting appropriate formulas in S for the letters in e. If we make these substitutions already in the original formulas of the form 4X4Á in S H from which e was derived, then we obtain formulas of the form 4X4Á in S. If we then follow exactly the same derivation step by step, we obtain f. Thus f is in the closure of the list of formulas of the form 4X4Á in S. A fortiori it is in the strong closure of the list of formulas of the form 4X4Á and 4X5Á, i.e., the set of tautologies. 9
Remark 8.62: If f and f A g are both in a state o, then g e o.
Proof: Follows from 4.2, since each state is by de®nition closed.
The following proposition is important in its own right, and also as a lemma for 8.3. Proof: 8.631 restates the coherence (6.1) and completeness (6.2) of o. Next, by 8.61, f A f R g and g A f R g are in each state, so``if '' in 8.632 follows 21 I.e., with a di¨erent alphabet. The reason for this caveat is that we may need more letters than are available in the given alphabet for which to substitute di¨erent formulas, though each of these formulas is in the given syntax. For example, let there be two individuals 1, 2, and let the given alphabet have only one letter x. Then 8.61 implies that k 1 x S k 2 x A k 1 x is a tautology, but this would not be so if the e of the lemma had to be in the given syntax. 22 Of course, if the substitutes (the formulas being substituted for the letters in e) are elementary, then f itself is a theorem of the propositional calculus. Our lemma applies to the more general case in which the substitutes may contain knowledge operators k i . 23 See, e.g., Hilbert and Ackermann (1928) , p. 22¨. They use the rule of substitution as well as modus ponens; our approach obviates the need for the rule of substitution, by using axiom schemas (families of axioms obtained by substituting arbitrary formulas for f Y g, and h) rather than axioms.
from 8.62. To prove``only if,'' suppose that on the contrary, f R g e o and f f o and g f o.
Since o is complete, it follows that X f e o and X g e o. Now by 8.61, X f A X g A X f R g e o. So X f e o and 8.62 yield X g A X f R g e o. So X g e o and 8.62 yield X f R g e o. 
Proof: L Ã contains f A g A f S g, which is a tautology by 8.61, and by hypothesis it contains f. So since it is closed (4.2), it contains g A f S g. But it also contains g. So since it is closed, it contains f S g. 9 Corollary 8.641. If f and g are tautologies, so is f S g.
Proof:
Since T is by de®nition strongly closed, it is closed. So T Ã T. The corollary now follows by setting L X T in 8.64. 9
Lemma 8.65. L Ã consists of all consequences of ®nite conjunctions of formulas in L.
Proof: By 8.64, all ®nite conjunctions of formulas in L are in L Ã . Also all tautologies are in L Ã , so since L Ã is closed, all consequences of ®nite conjunctions of formulas in L are in L Ã . It remains to show that the set of all such consequences is closed. So suppose that f is a ®nite conjunction of formulas in L, that g is a consequence of f, and that g A h is a tautology; it is su½cient to show that h is also a consequence of f. But g being a consequence of f means that f A g is a tautology. So by 8.641, f A g S g A h is a tautology. By 8.61, f A g S g A h A f A h is a tautology. So since T is closed, f A h is a tautology. So h is a consequence of f. 9 
in L, and a formula e, such that g S f A e and h S f A X e are tautologies, where g X g 1 S g 2 S Á Á Á S g m and h X h 1 S h 2 S Á Á Á S h n . Hence by 8.641, g S f A e S h S f A X e is a tautology. By 8.61, g S f A e S h S f A X e A g S h A X f is a tautology. Since the set of tautologies is closed, we deduce that g S h A X f is a tautology. Now g S h is a ®nite conjunction of formulas in L, so we deduce that X f e L Ã , contrary to our hypothesis. Only if: Suppose that L is consistent. We must ®nd a state that includes L. Let f 1 Y f 2 Y F F F be an enumeration of all formulas. We will de®ne a nested sequence L 1 r L 2 r Á Á Á (possibly ®nite) such that L Ã y is a state, where m , so by construction, it contains, for each formula f n , either f n or X f n ; i.e., it is complete. Moreover, since L y is consistent, L Ã y cannot contain both. Thus L Ã y is complete and coherent. Moreover it is closed and contains all tautologies, so it is a state; denoting it o completes the proof. 9
Lemma 8.71. Let e be a theorem of the propositional calculus, possibly in a syntax di¨erent from the given one25. Let f be a formula (in the given syntax) that is obtained by substitution from e. Then k i f is a tautology for all i.
Proof: By 8.61, f is a tautology; since the set T of tautologies is by de®nition strongly closed, 4.3 yields k i f e T. 9 Lemma 8.72. k i f S g D k i f S k i g is a tautology. Proof: By 8.71, k i f S g A f is a tautology, and so a member of each o. So by 4.52 and 4.2, k i f S g A k i f is a tautology. Similarly, k i f S g A k i g is a tautology, and it follows that
For the other direction, note ®rst that by 8.61, f A g A f S g is a tautology. So by 8.71, k i f A g A f S g is a tautology. So by 4.52, k i f A k i g A f S g is a tautology. Again by 4.52, k i g A f S g A k i g A k i f S g. Combining the last two observations, we deduce that k i f A k i g A k i f S g is a tautology, and from this it follows that To demonstrate r, let o e K i E f . Then by 1.21,
We wish to show that o e E k i f , which by 8.2 is the same as 
is a tautology. So by 4.3 and T being strongly closed, k i k i f 1 S k i f 2 S Á Á Á S k i f m A f is a tautology. So by 4.52 and 4.2, k i k i f 1 S k i f 2 S Á Á Á S k i f m A k i f is a tautology. Using 8.72 and that k i k i g D k i g is a tautology (8.1), we deduce that We proceed next to prove 8.5. First, an auxiliary proposition that is of interest on its own. Proposition 8.8. A formula is a tautology if and only if it is in every state.
Proof:``Only if '' is part of the de®nition of state. To prove``if '', suppose that g e o for all states o. Then X g f o for all o, so by 8.7, the list fX gg is not consistent. So by 8.66, there is an f in fX gg Ã with X f e fX gg Ã . By 8.65, it follows that both f and X f are consequences of X g. Thus both X g A f and X g A X f are tautologies, so X g A f S X g A X f is a tautology. Now X y A x S X y A X x A y is a theorem of the propositional calculus, so by 8.61, X g A f S X g A X f A g is a tautology. But the list of all tautologies is closed, since it is strongly closed; so g is a tautology. 9
Proof of Proposition 8.5: Suppose ®rst that f A g is a tautology. Then it is in every state o. Hence if f e o, then since o is closed, it follows that g e o.
Hence E f fo e X f e og r fo e X g e og E g . This proves``if ''.
Conversely, suppose that f A g is not a tautology. Then by 8.8, there is a state o that does not contain f A g, so contains X f A g. Now X f A g A f S X g is a tautology by 8.61, so it is in o. Since o is closed, it follows that f S X g e o; so by 8.633, f e o and X g e o, so g f o. So E f is not included in E g . This proves``only if ''. 9
We come now to the proofs of 8.51 and 8.52; it is convenient to start with 8.52.
Proof of 8.52: f D g is a tautology i¨f A g and g A f are tautologies, which is i¨E f r E g and E g r E f , i.e., E f E g . 9
For the proof of 8.51, two more lemmas are needed (again of interest in their own right). 
Proof: To show r, note that by 1.4 and 8.4,
, and then use 1.31. To show ', note that
, where r follows from the intersection of a smaller family being larger, and the ®rst sign from 8.1 and 8.52 (which has already been proved). 9
Proof of 8.51: If: Assume E s U f X k i f e o E f ; from 1.32, 1.4, 8.4, and 8.2 we get 
We conclude this section with Proposition 8.9. A list is a state if and only if it is complete and consistent.
Proof: By 8.69, every state is complete and consistent. Conversely, let L be a complete consistent list. By 8.7, there is a state o with L r o. If the inclusion is strict, there is a formula f with f e o and f f L. Since L is complete, X f e L, so X f e o, so f f o by the coherence of o, contradicting f e o. 9
Representations and models
This section treats the notion of``model.'' The idea is to``interpret'' syntactic formulas as events in a semantic knowledge system S (not necessarily the canonical system). The letters xY yY zY F F F of the alphabet are interpreted as certain distinguished events X Y Y Y ZY F F F in S; the syntactic knowledge operators k i as semantic knowledge operators K i ; and disjunctions, conjunctions, and negations as unions, intersections, and complements respectively. Thus each formula f corresponds to a unique event F in S, constructed from the distinguished events X Y Y Y ZY F F F like f is constructed from the alphabet letters xY yY zY F F F X Substantively, f and F have similar content; to say them in English, one uses the same words. There is, however, a subtle di¨erence between them. A syntactic formula f is, so to speak,``context-free;'' the semantic system S provides the context, the environment. Thus, f entails nothing except the formula itself and its logical consequences ± strictly in the sense of Section 4. The corresponding event F may entail much more, depending on the system S in which F is imbedded. Speci®cally, F entails all those events G that include F, although G may correspond to a formula g that does not follow from f`l ogically'' ± in the sense of Section 4 ± but only, so to speak, in the``context'' of S.
A formula f is said to hold at a state o in S if o is a member of the event F corresponding to f. A model of a list L of formulas is a state o in a semantic knowledge system S at which each formula in L holds. The main result of this section, Proposition 9.2, is that a list is consistent if and only if it has a model. In practice, pointing to a model is the major practical tool for proving consistency of lists ± or indeed, proving that an individual formula is not tautologically false; proving consistency directly, by syntactic methods only, is notoriously cumbersome. The other side of the same coin is Corollary 9.3, which says that a formula g``follows'' from a list L if and only if g holds in every model of L. This, too, is a major tool in practical applications. As promised in Section 5, we also show that the tautologies are precisely those formulas that hold at each state of each semantic knowledge system (Corollary 9.4).
One simple application of these ideas is Corollary 9.5 ± that the canonical knowledge system de®ned in Section 6 is non-empty, i.e., that there exists at least one complete coherent list for every population and alphabet. Obvious as this may sound, it is not easily established by purely syntactic methods. But using the idea of model, it is immediate. One need only point to a state (any state) in a semantic knowledge system (any such system ± for example, the system with one state only). The set of all formulas holding at that state is closed, complete and coherent, and contains all tautologies (Lemma 9.21).
A more substantial application is to issues of cardinality. Using 9.2, one may show that when there are at least two players, the canonical system has a continuum of states, even when the alphabet has just one letter. Two proofs are known. One is by Hart, Heifetz, and Samet (1996) ± henceforth HHS; the other is in the appendix to this paper. Both are based on Proposition 9.2. HHS prove that there is a continuum of states by exhibiting a continuum of lists, each of which is consistent in itself, but any two of which are mutually inconsistent; by 8.7, each of these lists can be expanded to a state. HHS's proof is shorter and more elegant than ours; we adduce the latter here``for the record,'' and because its method, though clumsier than HHS's, may sometimes be applicable where theirs is not (needless to say, the opposite is also true).
To complete the picture, we will show in the appendix that when there is only one individual (and the alphabet is ®nite), then is ®nite. This underscores the relative complexity of many-person epistemology when compared with one-person epistemology.
We proceed now to the formal treatment. Fix a population N and an alphabet X X fxY yY F F Fg; let S X SNY X be the corresponding syntax. Recall (from Section 2) that a semantic knowledge system (or simply knowledge system for short) consists of a population, a universe , and knowledge functions26 k i for each individual i; denote the knowledge operators in such a system by K i , and the u®eld of events by E. For brevity, we will sometimes denote the whole knowledge system simply by , rather than Y NY k i i . This is standard mathematical usage: A group is de®ned as a pair consisting of a set G and a multiplication, but the group (i.e., the pair) is itself often denoted G; a metric space is a set together with a metric, but the space and the set are often denoted by the same letter; and so on.
De®ne a representation of S as a knowledge system Y NY k i i , together with a function j X S 3 E satisfying
We will slightly abuse our terminology by using``representation'' to refer also to just itself, or just j itself (not just to the pair consisting of the knowledge system and j). Given j and a particular formula f, we will also call j f thè`r epresentation of f.'' Remark 9.11: For each knowledge system , each function from the alphabet X into E has a unique extension to a representation of S.
Proof: Follows from 9.1, as each formula f results from a unique sequence of operations XY R, and k i . 9
Remark 9.11 implies that one can think of a representation of S simply as an (arbitrary) knowledge system , together with an (arbitrary) speci®cation of events jxY j yY F F F corresponding to the letters of the alphabet. Intuitively, the events jxY jyY F F F may be thought of as the``natural'' events.
Given a representation j of S and a state o in , de®ne
In words, f o is the list of all formulas that hold at o, i.e., whose representation j f obtains at o. Let L r S be a list. De®ne a model for L as a representation Y j of S together with a state o in at which all formulas in L hold (i.e., o e j f for all f in L).
Proposition 9.2. A list L of formulas is consistent if and only if it has a model.
We ®rst prove
Lemma 9.21. Let Y j be a representation of the syntax S, and let o e . Then f o e .
In words: For a ®xed representation, the list of all formulas that hold at a given state o is closed, coherent, complete, and contains all tautologies; i.e., it is a state in the canonical knowledge system.
We must prove that the list o is closed, coherent, complete, and contains all tautologies.
To say that o is closed means that it satis®es 4.2; i.e., that ( f e o and f A g e o) implies g e o; i.e., that o e j f and o e jX f R g implies o e jgX 9X22
Now o e j f and o e jX f R g iff o e j f jX f R gY 9X23
and since j f jh j f S h by 9.1, we have
putting together 9.23 and 9.24 yields 9.22. We prove next that o contains all tautologies. First we show if e is a tautologyY then je X 9X25
Indeed, let T be the list of all formulas e such that je . Using 9.1 and 1.31 through 1.33, we verify directly that every formula with one of the seven forms 4.41 through 4.53 is in T. Moreover, if f e T and f A g e T then j f and
T is strongly closed. Thus T is strongly closed and contains all formulas of the form 4.41 through 4.53, so it includes the strong closure of the list of all formulas of this form, i.e., the list of all tautologies; this proves 9.25. It follows that o e je for all tautologies e, so o contains all tautologies, as asserted.
Finally, to verify completeness (6.2) and coherence (6.1), note that
Thus o is a closed, coherent, complete list that contains all tautologies; i.e., o f o is a state. 9
Proof of Proposition 9.2: Only if: Let the knowledge system consist of the state space together with N and the knowledge functions k i constructed in Section 6. De®ne j f X fo e X f e og ( E f , by 8.2). By 8.3 and 8.4, j sat- Proof: Recall that L Ã denotes the list of all consequences of ®nite conjunctions of formulas in a list L (8.65). If g is not in L Ã , then by 8.68, L fX gg is consistent, so by 9.2 has a model, which by 9.13 is not a model for fgg. In the opposite direction, if it is not the case that every model for L is also a model for fgg, then L has a model that is not a model for fgg, and so by 9.21 is a model for fX gg, hence also for L fX gg. So by 9.2, L fX gg is consistent, so by 8.68, g f L Ã . 9
Corollary 9.4. A formula f is a tautology if and only if for any representation, j f (in words, if and only if f holds at each state in each representation).
Proof:``Only if '' follows from 9.21. To show``if,'' note ®rst that by 8.3 and 8.4, the canonical semantic knowledge system , together with the function j on S de®ned by j f X E f , constitute a representation of S. So by hypothesis, E f j f , which means that f is in every state of . So by 8.8, f is a tautology. 9
Corollary 9.5. The canonical knowledge system is non-empty.
Proof: By Lemma 9.21, f o is always in ; so it is enough to show that there exists some semantic knowledge system, and that is obvious (for example, the one with one state only).
Note to Section 9
In this note we show that every representation of S can be thought of as a common knowledge subuniverse of . More precisely, for every representation there is a common knowledge subuniverse of such that the given representation is isomorphic, in a natural sense, to this common knowledge subuniverse.
Given a representation Y j of the syntax S, denote S X jS r E, and call the events in S syntactic. In words, a syntactic event is one of the form j f ; one that corresponds, under the representation j, to a formula in the syntax S.
Now let 1 Y j 1 and 2 Y j 2 be two representations of S; set S j X j j SY j 1Y 2. Call j 1 and j 2 isomorphic if there is a one-one mapping F (an isomorphism) from S 1 onto S 2 such that j 2 F j 1 (see the diagram at 9.6).
9X6
Let Y j be a representation of S. By 9.21, for each state o in , the list f o is a state o in . The set of all o obtained in this way is a subset of , which we denote j . Formally, j X f . In words, a state in is in j iï t corresponds to some o in under the representation j; i.e., i¨it consists of precisely those formulas f for which the representation j f holds at o. Denote by q j the smallest common knowledge subuniverse27 of that includes j . By associating with q j the population N and the knowledge functions k i jq j , we obtain a knowledge system; denote the set of events in this system by E j . De®ne j Ã X S 3 E j by
For the proof of 9.7, we need several lemmas. In the statements of these lemmas, f, g, and h denote arbitrary formulas.
Lemma 9.71. fj f E f j .
Proof:
We have fj f ff o X o e j f g, so o e fj f i¨there is an o e j f with o f o fg X o e jgg, and this is so i¨f e o e j ; thus fj f fo e j X o e f g E f j . 9
Lemma 9.72. j r E f i¨ j f .
Proof: By 9.72, j r E f yields j f . Hence by 9.1, K i K i j f jk i f . So again by 9.72, j r K i E f . 9
Lemma 9.74. If j r E f , then q j r E f .
Proof: Set F X UE f , where the intersection is over all f with j r E f . From 1.4, 8.4, and 9.73, it follows that K i F F for all i. Thus F is self-evident, and so a subuniverse of . By de®nition, F s j . Hence F includes the smallest subuniverse that includes j , namely q j . But by its de®nition, F is included in each E f for which j r E f , so the lemma is proved. 9
Lemma 9.75. j Ã g j Ã h i¨jg jh.
Proof: If: Assume jg jh. Then by 9.71, E g j fjg fjh E h j . Thus for each o in j , we have g e o i¨h e o, which, by 8.635, is equivalent to g D h e o. Now set f X g D h. Then f e o for each o in j ; that is, j r E f . So by 9.74, q j r E f E gDh . Thus g D h e o for each o in q j ; that is, g e o i¨h e o for each such o; that is,
Then o e f j r q j , and g e o but h f o.
Proof of 9.7: To prove that j Y j Ã is a representation of S, we establish 9.1 for j Ã . From 9.61 and 8.31 we get
From 9.61 and 8.32 we get
From 9.61, 8.4, 1.4, and q j being a subworld, we get
Combining 9.76 through 9.78, we conclude28 that j Ã is indeed a representation of S.
28 The conclusion from 9.38 uses the fact that the knowledge operator for the universe q j is K i jE j ; this follows from q j being a subuniverse.
That j Ã is isomorphic with j follows from 9.75. 9
Discussion
(a) The meaning of the knowledge operators K i
Proposition 8.4 says that when K i is applied to a syntactic event E f , its meaning corresponds precisely to that of the knowledge operator k i on the formula f. But the domain of K i includes all events ± all subsets of ± not just syntactic events. Thus one may ask how to interpret K i E for events E that are not syntactic (e.g., in®nite unions of syntactic events). Speci®cally, is it still correct that K i E means``i knows E''? This question is in the interpretive realm; the answer depends on how we think about it. On the straightforward intuitive level, the answer is``no.'' With the de®nition in Section 6, the correct interpretation of K i E is not that``i knows E'', but that``E follows logically from the syntactic events that i knows'' (see 8.51 ). An individual i may know something without its following logically from the syntactic events (formulas) that he knows; in that case, K i E does not obtain, though it is the case that``i knows E''.
For example, i might know an in®nite disjunction without knowing any of the partial ®nite disjunctions. Thus suppose that the alphabet contains in®-nitely many letters x 1 Y x 2 Y F F F X The event E x 1 E x 2 Á Á Á signi®es that``at least one of the x m obtains''. But K i E x 1 E x 2 Á Á Á does not signify that``i knows that at least one of the x m obtains''; rather, it signi®es the stronger statement that``it follows from the formulas known to i that at least one of the x m obtains.'' For this, i must know some ®nite disjunction x 1 R x 2 R Á Á Á R x m .
More generally, we have
That the right side is included in the left follows from 1.32, 8.3 and 8.4 . To prove the opposite inclusion, let o e K i E f 1 E f 2 E f 3 Á Á ÁX Then by 1.21, 
So by 1.21 and 8.4,
For another illustration29, consider an alphabet with just one letter x. Let N f1Y 2Y 3g (three individuals). The statement``x is common knowledge between 1 and 2'' describes the event30 K y 12 E x . But``3 knows that x is not common knowledge between 1 and 2'' does not describe the event K 3 dK y 12 E x . Indeed,``3 knows that x is not common knowledge between 1 and 2'' means that 3 knows that mutual knowledge of x between 1 and 2 (Section 2) fails at some level, but he (3) need not know at which level it fails31. On the other hand, K 3 dK y 12 E x signi®es that mutual knowledge of x between 1 and 2 fails at some speci®ed level m that 3 knows.
Formally, K 12 E x signi®es that mutual knowledge of x between 1 and 2 fails at a level known to 3, as asserted.
Note that there is no event E r that signi®es``3 knows that x is not common knowledge between 1 and 2''. Events can only represent statements that are constructed from (®nite) formulas by means of negation, conjunction and disjunction (possibly in®nite or even non-denumerable). The statement``3 knows that x is not common knowledge between 1 and 2'' is not of this kind. In contrast,``x is common knowledge between 1 and 2'' does describe an event (i.e., a subset of ), though not a syntactic event; and of course, the same holds for``x is not common knowledge between 1 and 2''. Also,``3 knows that x is common knowledge between 1 and 2'' describes an event, namely the event K 3 dK y 12 E x ; this is because knowledge operators commute with intersections (1.4), but not with unions.
Up to now in this section, we have taken the``intuitive'' view: that there is some informal notion of knowledge, not embodied in the syntactic knowledge operators k i , that enables us to speak of, say,``knowing'' an in®nite disjunction even when we don't know any of the partial ®nite disjunctions. But it is possible also to take a di¨erent, more formal view: that in an essay of this kind, it is not appropriate to discuss concepts that are not given formal, mathematical expressions. With this view, all relevant knowledge is embodied in formulas; the term``knowledge'' is meaningful only when it is derived from knowledge of formulas.
If we take this view, we must adjust our answer to the question that begins this section,``does K i E mean`i knows E'?'' The answer now becomes``yes.'' Substantively, nothing has changed; as before, K i E still means``E follows 29 Communicated by Moshe Vardi. 30 See Section 2; we do not distinguish between K y 12 and K y f1Y 2g . 31 For example, this could happen if 2 tells 3,``x is not common knowledge between 1 and me,'' and 3 knows that 2 tells the truth. 32 If x is mutual knowledge at the m'th level, it certainly is at any lower level. logically from the formulas that i knows.'' But with the new view, there is no other knowledge; all knowledge is embodied in formulas; you can't know something unless it follows logically from the ®nite formulas that you know.
Under this view, 10.1 may be stated verbally as follows:``i knows an in®-nite disjunction of formulas if and only if he knows the disjunction of some ®nite subset of these formulas.'' One may take this view as representing a procedural position only, according to which one should not discuss a concept (such as knowledge of in®nite disjunctions) that is not part of the formal framework. But one can also take it as representing a deeper philosophical position, somewhat reminiscent of the intuitionistic school of mathematics that was popular at the beginning of this century. According to this position, the in®nite is at best a useful abstraction ± a shorthand for avoiding complex, cumbersome formulations. Substantively, all real knowledge must, in the end, be ®nitely describable.
While we ®nd this position attractive, we do not take an unequivocal stand on these matters. We are pragmatists; our purpose is to develop epistemic machinery that will be useful in the applications. When all is said and done, there is little real di¨erence between the views and positions we have described; they only represent di¨erent``angles,'' di¨erent ways of looking at the same thing. The reader may choose the approach he prefers ± or supply his own.
(b) An alternative interpretation of the letters of the alphabet
In Section 5, we interpreted the letters in the alphabet as``natural occurrences'': substantive happenings that are not themselves described either in terms of people knowing something, or as combinations of other natural happenings using the connectives of the propositional calculus. An alternative interpretation is that a letter of the alphabet may represent any occurrence whatsoever. Usually, the letters will repre sent occurrences in which one is particularly interested, the objects of the analysis. If they happen to refer to an individual knowing something, or to involve logical connectives, that is alright.
A basic rationale for the ®rst interpretation is to avoid logically inequivalent representations of the same occurrence, which would lead tò`s tates of the world'' that are in practice impossible. Thus if x denotes``it will snow tomorrow'', and y denotes``2 knows it will snow tomorrow,'' then formally there is a state o at which both k 2 x and X y hold, and this is nonsensical. By restricting the alphabet to``natural'' occurrences, we seek to avoid this awkwardness.
The trouble with this is that though a natural occurrence is most directly described without knowledge operators or logical connectives, it may have practical implications that do involve them; and then we are back with the original problem. For example,``Alice and Bob played a game of chess'' implies that``Bob knows that Alice won or Bob knows that Alice did not win'', and this implication is commonly known. A formal system that always avoided this awkwardness would be quite cumbersome, and it does not seem worthwhile to try to construct one.
We have seen that in the alternative interpretation, where a letter may represent any occurrence whatsoever, there may well be``impossible'' states:
states that conform to the formal consistency requirements of Section 6, but that cannot occur when the meaning of the letters is taken into account (like the state o discussed above, containing both X y and k 2 x, even though y and k 2 x have the same meaning). Di¨erently put, it may happen that in a speci®c application, there are logical connections between the formulas constituting a syntax; connections that are inherent in the interpretations of the letters of the alphabet within the application ± and so are commonly known ± but that do not follow from the axioms of the propositional calculus (4.4) and of knowledge (4.5). In such an application, we will wish to reserve the term``state'' for those states that are actually``possible'' ± states at which the logical connections that are inherent in the interpretations of the letters are satis®ed and are commonly known. The states that are in this sense``possible'' constitute a common knowledge subuniverse of .
(c) Knowledge hierarchies
The ®rst explicit constructions33 of canonical semantic formalisms were hierarchical. For simplicity, suppose there are just two players. Start with a set H of mutually exclusive and exhaustive``states of nature,'' which describe some aspect of reality (like tomorrow's temperature in Jerusalem) in terms not involving knowledge. Let H 1 be the set of non-empty subsets of HY H 2 the set of non-empty subsets of H Â H 1 Y H 3 the set of non-empty subsets of H Â H 1 Â H 2 , and so on. A knowledge hierarchy h i of a player i has in®nitely many levels. Level 1 describes i's information about the true state s of nature; formally, it is a member h Not all sequences h i in H 1 Â H 2 Â Á Á Á are feasible hierarchies of i; some consistency conditions must be met. For h i to be feasible, it must be that (i) i's information at each level is consistent with his information at all previous levels, (ii) i knows that j considers i's information possible, and (iii) i knows that j's hierarchy h j is feasible. Formally, we ®rst de®ne feasibility for ®nite sequences h 33 Which were in the probabilistic context; see the companion paper to this one (Aumann 1999) . 34 Though i's information about the state of nature is already embodied in his Level 1, it is not enough at Level 2 to specify just his information about j's Level 1; we need his information about the pair h 0 Y h
Proof: Since L is consistent in NY X, it has a model in that context. This can be converted to a model for L in the larger context by de®ning k j and jz in an arbitrary fashion when j is not in N and z is a letter not in X (e.g., one can de®ne the k j as constants and the jz as o is at most n).
Proof:
by A.33, this holds i¨it is not the case that d E s B oY n, i.e., i¨ E B oY n H q. 9
Proof of Proposition A.2: Since jNj d 0 and jXj d 0 , the set of formulas is at most denumerable, so the set of sets of formulas has cardinality 2 d 0 . Since a state o is a set of formulas, it follows that jj 2 d 0 . To prove jj 2 d 0 , we will construct a continuum of di¨erent lists, each of which is consistent, but any two of which contradict each other. Since any consistent list can be extended to a state (8.7), it will follow that there is a continuum of states. To show that the lists are indeed consistent, we construct models for them (9.2).
By A.1, we may assume w.l.o.g. that jNj 2 and jXj 1. The models we construct all use the same universe . o n and o m is jn À mj. Since there is only one letter x in the alphabet, in order to de®ne a representation, we need only specify to which o n we assign x and to which X x (9.11). Start out by assigning X x to o 0 and 
To prove A.4, we need some lemmas. Since there is only one individual, we write k for k i .
Lemma A.41. k f R kg D k f R kg is a tautology for all f and g.
Proof: This is most quickly proved directly from the de®nitions in Section 4; but we prefer verbal reasoning37, which makes the proof more transparent. We use 8.8, which says that a formula is a tautology i¨it is in every state. Thus given an arbitrary state o, we must show k f R kg D k f R kg e o.
To this end, we use 8.63, which enables us to replace symbols like RY X, and A by the corresponding words. The process is facilitated by writing``f'' for the more cumbersome f e o; thus``f'' means``f holds at o''.
We wish to prove that``k f R kg'' i¨``k f R kg''. To show``if '', assumè`k f R kg''. If``kf'', then``k f R kg'' (4.52), so we are done. If``kg'', theǹ`k kg'' (8.1), so``k f R kg'' (4.52), and again we are done.
To show``only if '', assume``k f R kg''. Then``f R kg'' (4.51). If``kg'', then``k f R kg'', so we are done. Otherwise``X kg'', so``k X kg'' (4.53), sò`k f R kg'' and``k X kg'', so``k f R kg S kX kg'', i.e.,``k f R kg S X kg'' (8.72), i.e.,``k f S X kg'', so``kf'' (4.52), so``k f R kg'', and again we are done. 9
Corollary A.42. kk f R kg D k f R kg is a tautology.
Proof: A.41 and 8.1. 9
Corollary A.43. k f R X kg D k f R X kg is a tautology.
Proof: A.41, 4.51, and 4.53. 9
Call a formula fundamental if it is either a letter in the alphabet or has the form kg, where g is elementary (contains no knowledge operators). Say that a formula has depth 1 if it is constructed from atomic formulas by using the symbols RY XY , and ( only. Thus a formula has depth 1 if and only if the knowledge operator is not concatenated.
Lemma A.44. If jNj 1, every formula is equivalent38 to a formula of depth 1.
Proof: De®ne a formula of depth n inductively by specifying that it be constructed from formulas of the form h and kh, where h is a formula of depth n À 1, by using the symbols RY XY ), and ( only. Clearly, each formula is of depth n for some n. Thus it su½ces to prove that a formula of depth 2 is equivalent to one of depth 1; and for this, it su½ces to prove that if h is of depth 1, then kh is equivalent to a depth 1 formula.
So let h be a formula of depth 1. Thus h is constructed from letters and from formulas of the form kg ± where g is an elementary formula ± by using the symbols of the propositional calculus only. Replace each occurrence in h 37 E.g., using words like``or'' and``not''. 38 Recall that f is tautologically equivalent to g ± or simply equivalent for short ± if f D g is a tautology.
of a formula of the form kg by a new letter, one that does not occur in the original alphabet. We thus get a new formula h H , which does not contain any knowledge operators. Write h H in its conjunctive normal form, i.e., as a conjunction of disjunctions of letters and their negatives39. Now replace the new letters ± those that replaced formulas of the form kg ± by the original formulas that they replaced. We thus conclude that hd f 1 Rq kg 11 Rq kg 12 R F F F S f 2 Rq kg 21 Rq kg 22 R F F F S F F F Y where $ stands for equivalence, q stands for either nothing or X, and in this instance, three does F F F indicate a ®nite sequence. From 8.72, A.41, A.42 and A.43 we then get khdk f 1 Rq kg 11 Rq kg 12 RF F FSk f 2 Rq kg 21 Rq kg 22 R F F FS F F F Y and the right side is a formula of depth 1. 9
Proof of Proposition A.4: From the conjunctive normal form it follows that with a given ®nite alphabet, there are at most ®nitely many inequivalent elementary formulas (only ®nitely many inequivalent disjunctions, so only ®nitely many inequivalent conjunctions of these disjunctions). Since f dg implies40 k f dkg, it follows that there are only ®nitely many formulas of the form kf where f is elementary. Hence there are only ®nitely many inequivalent ®rst order formulas. The proposition now follows from A.44. 9
